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Firms’ Dynamic Adjustment to Target Capital
Structures in Transition Economies





We study the capital structure dynamics of Central and Eastern European firms in order to get a better
understanding of the quantitative and qualitative development of the financial systems in this region.
The dynamic model we use endogenizes the target leverage as well as the adjustment speed and is
applied to  microeconomic  data for ten  countries.  We  find  that  during  the  transition  process  firms
generally increased their leverage, lowering the gap between actual and target leverage. Profitability
and age are the most robust determinants of capital structure targets. Older firms attract more bank
debt, whereas profitability decreases firms’ leverage targets. While banking system development has
in general enabled firms to get closer to their leverage targets, information asymmetries between firms
and banks are still important. As a result, firms prefer internal finance above bank debt (pecking order
behaviour) and adjust leverage only slowly.
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1 Introduction
With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
began  a  process  of  profound  economic  transition.  Socialist  institutions  disappeared,  whereas  new
capitalist  inspired  institutions  –  such  as  well-functioning  legal  systems  –  were  introduced  later.
Moreover, financial markets were virtually absent and the banking system was inefficient and almost
entirely state-owned. This all led to a hostile  environment for new  entrepreneurs, in which it  was
potentially difficult to attract external financing. Start-ups mainly had to rely on internal funds.
Recently,  the  negative  influence  of  such  hostile  business  environments  has  received
considerable  attention,  as  a  rapidly  expanding  empirical  literature  has  shown  that  adequate  and
enforceable laws stimulate financial system development. Banks that are backed-up by appropriate
laws are, for instance, better able to screen firms, pick the most profitable ones, provide them with
funds, and monitor their managers. In this way, financial intermediaries boost the capital stock as well
as productivity, thus speeding up economic development.
1 The banking systems in CEE have only
recently  started  to  perform  this  role.  While  stock  markets  and  corporate  debt  markets  are  still  of
negligible size, the local banking systems have gone through a remarkable transformation process,
consisting of the breaking up of the socialist monobanks, creating free-standing statebanks, and finally
privatising these to (foreign) strategic investors. New banks were allowed as well. Transition countries
have shown considerable divergence as regards their approaches and swiftness in creating  market-
oriented banking systems. National differences remain as to how much the banking system fulfils the
real economy’s quantitative and qualitative financing needs.
In this paper, we ask to what extent the financial systems in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  the  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  have
facilitated firms to reach their capital structure targets.
2 First, we ask ourselves to what extent capital
structure targets of firms in different transition economies are driven by similar determinants. Are
capital structure models “portable” across different financial and economic systems? Second, we want
to know whether the gaps between actual and target capital ratios have narrowed during the transition
process. Third, we focus on the speed of adjustment to the target structures. To the extent that firms
have been able to close (part of) their capital structure gaps, we take this as evidence of qualitative
financial  development.  The  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  corporate  finance  in  transition
economies in three ways.
3 First, we use an extensive firm-level panel dataset for ten countries during
                                                  
1 See La Porta et al (1998), Levine (1999), and De Haas (2004) on the nexus between law, finance, and
economic growth.
2 Target capital structures are sometimes referred to as optimal capital structures. We prefer the former term
since it better captures the idea that the “optimum” in our model is actually a moving target rather than a “fixed”
one and since it better expresses the fact that the target structure is the capital structure a firm is trying to reach.
3 We know of three papers that estimate a firm-level capital structure model for transition economies. Klapper et
al (2002) focus on a broad set of transition countries, but only use data for 1999 in their static model. Cornelli et
al (1996) only look at Hungary and Poland and use a static model for 1992. Nivorozhkin (2003) uses a dynamic
model, but only for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria during 1993-1997. In addition, Booth et al (2001), using a
static model, study firms’ capital structure choice in ten non-transition developing countries.2
the 1990s. Second, we estimate a dynamic model that explicitly takes into account the fact that firms’
actual and target capital structures may differ. Third, we use a comprehensive set  of variables for
which theory suggests that they determine a firm’s target capital structure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the dynamic adjustment model of firms’
capital structure. Section 3 then describes the variables that may affect the target capital structure and
the  adjustment  speed,  after  which  section  4  explains  our  empirical  results.  Section  5  concludes.
Detailed information on the data is given in the appendix.
2  Modelling capital structure dynamics
2.1 Introduction
According  to  trade-off  theory,  firms  optimise  their  capital  structure  because  they  face  a  trade-off
between  the  advantageous  and  disadvantageous  effects  of  debt  on  firm  value.  On  the  one  hand,
increasing leverage by issuing (more) debt means that the firm can profit more from debt tax shields,
which will increase its value (Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) Proposition I under corporate taxes). On
the other hand, higher leverage leads to higher (expected) direct and indirect costs of financial distress,
decreasing the firm’s value. Direct costs include the legal and administrative costs of liquidation or
reorganisation. Indirect costs refer to the impaired ability to conduct business and to agency costs of
debt  that  are  specifically  related  to  periods  of  high  bankruptcy  risk  (such  as  the  incentive  for
stockholders to select risky projects) (Ross et al, 2002).
4
This section presents a dynamic capital structure model mainly along the lines of Banerjee,
Heshmati,  and  Wihlborg  (2000),  henceforth  BHW.
5  The  model  presumes  that  the  actual  capital
structure of a particular firm at a particular moment in time does not  necessarily  equal  the  target
capital structure of that firm.
6 Instead, it assumes that a firm dynamically adjusts its capital structure to
a  moving  target. This  target  is  not  observed  by  us,  but  is  specified  and  estimated.  Moreover,  by
relating the adjustment parameter to firm- and time-specific variables, we allow individual firms to
control the speed of adjustment in attaining their target capital structure.
2.2 The target capital structure
The target leverage ratio for each firm is not observed, but is assumed to be a function F of several
(observable) determinants, i.e.
                                                  
4 At the same time, a debt increase lowers the agency costs associated with equity financing, such as shirking.
5 See Heshmati (2002), Kumbhakar et al (2002), and Lööf (2003) for empirical applications of this model to the
UK, US, and Sweden, respectively.
6 Capital structure theory generally aims to explain target capital structures not observed capital structures.
Empirical studies usually assume that target capital structures can be reasonably proxied by observed capital
structures, which may not be the case if adjustment costs are important.3
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it L  is the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t,  it Y  is a vector of firm- and time-specific
determinants, and  i Y  and  t Y  are firm-, respectively time-specific  effects. For each firm the target
leverage may thus change over time, reflecting changes in its determinants.
2.3  The adjustment towards the target capital structure
In the optimum, the leverage of a firm will equal its target leverage. In practice, however, a firm may
choose not to adjust its leverage fully to the target. This will be the case when adjustment costs are
high or when the financial system is simply not able to cater to the financing needs of firms. Actual
leverage may then be adjusted only partially to the target leverage:
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where  it G  is the adjustment parameter representing the magnitude of adjustment during one period
(also termed the adjustment speed). If  it G  = 1 full adjustment is achieved within one period and actual
leverage at the end of the period will equal the target as set at the beginning of that period. Note that in
our model the adjustment during the current period is made on the basis of 
*
1 ￿ it L  rather than 
*
it L  (as is
the case in the original BHW-model).
7 The reason for making this adaptation is twofold. First, we
think this specification better captures actual firm behaviour. Since we use balance sheet and P&L-
data the t subscripts refer to end year values. As an example, assume that t equals December 31
st 2003,
so that t-1 refers to December 31
st 2002. According to (2a) the change in leverage during 2003 will
then be a certain percentage ( it G ) of the difference between the target leverage as calculated at the
beginning of 2003 and the actual leverage at that same moment. Also note that according to (1) the
target at the beginning of the year is calculated on the basis of the information that is available at that
moment. Specifying 
*
it L  rather than 
*
1 ￿ it L  would imply that the adjustment process during 2003 would
be based on information that would effectively only become available at the end of 2003 when closing
the books. We therefore assume that the adjustment during the year is made on the basis of beginning-
                                                  
7 Here we follow Flannery and Rangan (2003). We also estimated regressions based on the exact BHW-model,
which yielded qualitatively similar results (available on request from the authors). See section 4.1 for more
details.4
of-year firm characteristics and that targets are not being revised during the year.
8 Secondly, from an
econometric  perspective,  our  specification  reduces  the  potential  for  simultaneity  bias  since  all
determinants are included with a one year lag in the estimated regressions.
2.4 The speed of adjustment
The speed of adjustment  it G  itself can be specified as a function G of underlying variables affecting
adjustment costs, i.e.:
(3) ) , , ( t i it it Z Z Z G   G
where  it Z  is a vector of time and firm specific explanatory variables, and  i Z  and  t Z are firm-specific
and time-specific effects, respectively. Most important element of  it Z  is the distance variable that is
measured as the absolute distance between the target leverage and the actual leverage at the beginning
of the year, i.e.  | | 1 1 ￿
￿
￿ ￿ t it L L . This variable allows us to estimate the influence the magnitude of the
deviation between the desired and the actual leverage has on the speed of adjustment.
2.5 The general functional relationships
Equations (1) and (3) are specified linearly as
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where the D’s and E ’s are parameters to be estimated.
2.6 The estimation strategy
The model to be estimated is (2b) where 
￿
it L  and  it G  are unobserved and specified according to (4)
and (5). The result is a de facto non-linear equation in the parameters as well as in the variables, which
we estimate by Non-Linear Ordinary Least Squares. The most complicating factor in the estimation
process is the inclusion of the distance variable mentioned in subsection 2.4. The inclusion of this
                                                  
8 We think this assumption to be more realistic than the one in BHW since in that model it is implicitly assumed
that firms can perfectly forecast the determinants of the target capital structure within a one year time horizon,5
variable makes the adjustment speed as specified in (5) dependent on the target leverage as specified
in (4). As a result, there is an internal iterative process which uses initial parameters as starting values
and stops iterating when the additional reduction in the sum of squared errors and the change in the
parameters is sufficiently small.
Estimation is carried out for each country and consists of four consecutive steps. First, we
estimate a static model (4), where the dependent variable is the actual rather than the target leverage.
Second, we estimate the dynamic equation (2b) – using the estimated parameters from the first step as
starting values – but keep the adjustment speed fixed. Third, we estimate (2b) again, but this time we
keep 
*
it L  fixed (at the estimated values of step two) and specify the adjustment speed equation as in
(5). And fourth, we estimate the complete dynamic model with the target leverage as specified in (4)
and the adjustment speed as specified in (5). As starting values we use the estimated parameters in the
second and third step. In this complete dynamic model both 
*
it L and the adjustment speed are thus
flexible.  Since  the  very  volatile  transition  period  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineties  may  distort  the
estimation results, we exclude the years 1993-1995 when running the regressions. The coefficients
obtained for the sample period 1996-2001 are then projected on the data for the years 1993-1995 so
that the target leverages and adjustment speeds are calculated for each of the years 1993-2001.
When estimating the complete dynamic model, we apply to each country a general-to-simple
approach starting with a broad set of explanatory variables and subsequently eliminating one at a time
the variable with the least significant coefficient, stopping at the 10% level of significance (except for
intercepts which are kept in the specifications independent of the significance of their coefficients).
9
We do thus not impose one particular set of variables on all countries, but allow the determinants of
capital structure to differ. (In addition we apply the same procedure to the whole dataset, i.e. all ten
countries,  in  order  to  create  a  benchmark  regression.)  We  can  then  compare  the  observed  capital
structures with the target capital structures as calculated on the basis of the estimated parameters. We
are particularly interested to find out whether the gap between them has narrowed during the transition
process. To the extent that firms have been able to close part of their capital structure gaps, we take
this as indirect proof of qualitative financial development.
                                                                                                                                                              
while they cannot forecast at all beyond this horizon.
9 In the initial set of potential determinants we also include sector dummies which we create by allocating each
firm, based on its ISIC code, to one of ten sector groups. Inclusion of sector dummies is important as they can
capture any sector-specific but time-invariant determinants of capital structure (fixed effects) which we do not
pick up by our firm-specific variables. Note that we do not include firm-specific dummies, nor do we estimate
firm level fixed effects. As De Haan and Hinloopen (2003, p. 680) explain, firm dummies would capture firm-
specific information that for our purposes should be fully included in the residual (since target leverage ratios are
defined as the predicted values in a regression explaining actual leverage). This could lead to a situation in which
a move towards a firm’s target could wrongly be interpreted as a move from its target.6
3 Capital structure measure and explanatory variables
3.1 The capital structure measure
We take firm-level data (1993-2001) from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS “top 200.000” database.
Annual balance sheet data and profit and loss account details are included for firms that have either
more than 100 employees, more than …￿￿￿PLOOLRQ￿RSHUDWLQJ￿UHYHQXH￿￿RU￿PRUH￿WKDQ￿…￿￿￿PLOOLRQ￿WRWDO
assets in one of the years available. The database is intended to cover only privately owned, not state-
owned firms (Klapper et al, 2002). Bureau van Dijk guarantees that 95% of all companies in each
country complying with one of these criteria, is included.
10
Our dependent variable is the leverage ratio, which we define as [100 * debt / (debt + equity)].
For  both  debt  and  equity  we  use  “backward  looking”  book  values  rather  than  “forward  looking”
market values, as only the former are included in the AMADEUS database.
11 However, using book
values rather than market values has some advantages. From a theoretical perspective, the book value
of debt is a better measure of the liability of debt-holders in case of bankruptcy. Also, when a firm has
issued debt, changes in the market value of this debt will not influence the cash savings due to the
interest tax shield. It is these cash savings that may influence the decision to issue debt in the first
place (Heshmati, 2002). Also note that the assumption that the value of firms’ debt and equity would
be determined by forward looking capital markets, would be inconsistent with our theoretical model in
which firm management itself is backward-looking. From a more practical point of view, it should be
noted that market values of traded equity often turn out to be excessively volatile, leading to severe
measurement problems. Calculating market values of debt, which is in most cases non-traded, may be
even more challenging. Finally, and reassuringly, comparable studies like BHW (2000, p. 2;10) and
Hovakimian et al (2001, p. 5) find that the choice between book and market value does not influence
results significantly. Bowman (1980) shows that the correlation between the book and market values
of debt is very large.
                                                  
10 The appendix gives a more detailed description of the data, including summary statistics and selection criteria.
11 Differences in leverage ratios between countries may partly reflect disparities between national accounting
standards. However, listed companies in all of the countries in our sample are required to adopt International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) at accession to the European Union, which has led to a convergence
process as regards accounting frameworks. Also note that Bureau van Dijk formats all companies uniformly to
allow better between-country analysis. According to Jelic et al (1999) differences between CEE and OECD
accounting standards do exist, but the amounts involved are minimal and do not have a significant effect when
making between-country comparisons of firm leverage using AMADEUS.7
Figure 1  Debt to total value non-financial firms in % (all book value, 1994)





















Definition: Debt is short-term debt plus long-term debt. Total value is debt plus equity
Source: OECD financial statistics 1995 (more recent comparable OECD statistics not available)
Figure 1 shows that in industrialised countries book value capital ratios generally lie between 50% and
80%.  In  contrast,  figure  2  summarises  the  development  of  firm  leverage  in  our  sample  of  CEE
countries. For each country we split the sample in four size categories, each thus representing 25% of
the observations, and subsequently calculated the median firm leverage in each size category. CEE
leverage ratios turn out to be mostly (considerably) below Western standards and ranged between 26%
in Bulgaria and 60% in Hungary in 2001. In that year Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland,
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic had median leverage ratios below 50%. In most CEE countries we
observe an upward trend in the leverage ratio during the transition process. The gradual development
of the financial system has enabled firms, of all size categories, to reach higher debt levels in Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland.
12 However, in Estonia and the Czech
Republic  there  is  a  significant  downward  trend  (at  a  5%  significance  level  from  the  correlation
statistics), while we find no correlation in Slovakia. In Estonia, leverage started to decline after the
1998 Russian crisis, which led to a crisis in the Estonian banking system and ultimately to the take-
over of the largest Estonian banks by Swedish and Finnish banking groups. Similarly, the 1997 Czech
currency  crisis  and  the  ensuing  credit  crunch,  aggravated  by  stricter  loan  classification  and
provisioning  rules  as  well  as  a restrictive  monetary  policy,  led  to  reduced  firm  leverage.  Also  in
Bulgaria we observe a sharp reduction in firms’ leverage ratios immediately after the 1996 banking
and currency crises, probably reflecting the sudden reduction in the supply of bank credit.
13 Whereas
Bulgarian firms have gradually recovered from the large drop in leverage ratios, Czech firms have not
been able to reverse the trend of declining leverage. Only in 2001 did (very) large firms slowly start to
leverage up again.
                                                  
12 In these countries there is a positive and significant (5% level) bivariate correlation between a time trend and
our leverage measure.
13 Except for the very small firms.8
















































































































As regards the relationship between size and leverage, we find that in Estonia, Latvia, and Hungary
large firms are on average significantly less leveraged (5% level). Interestingly, we find that only in
Romania and Bulgaria there is a significant positive bivariate relationship between size and leverage
(5% level).
14 This is in line with earlier empirical results showing that especially in these countries the
problem of soft budget constraints for large state-owned companies had been protracted (e.g. Budina
et al (2002), Everaert and Hildebrandt (2001), Konings et al (2003)). In all other countries we find no
significant bivariate relationship between size and actual leverage.
3.2 The determinants of the target capital structure
As  described  in  section  2.1,  trade-off  theory  provides  for  the  main  underlying  framework  of  our
theoretical model, as we assume that firms aim at a specific, but changing, target capital structure.
However, an important rival capital structure theory is the pecking order hypothesis, which argues that
due to asymmetric information between managers and investors, firms that need additional financing
prefer internal financing to  debt financing and debt financing to issuing shares (Donaldson, 1961;
Myers, 1984). In its pure form, the pecking order hypothesis implies that firms do not have a target
leverage as such. Instead, current leverage mainly reflects firms’ historical profitability and their need
for additional investment funds. In practice, firms’ leverage ratios may be influenced by both types of
processes. De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) show for instance that both trade-off and pecking order
theory are of empirical importance in explaining the financing choices of Dutch firms. And whereas
trade-off considerations may be important in the longer run, pecking order considerations may matter
in the short run (Hovakimian et al, 2001; Remolona, 1990). Below we list a broad set of variables for
which one or both theories suggest that they should be included in our analysis.
15 We briefly describe
the relationship we expect with firms’ target capital structure and whether this relationship is based on
trade-off  or  pecking  order  considerations.  We  also  explain  how  we  operationalise  the  particular
variable and whether the idiosyncrasies of the transition process warrant different a priori expectations
about the economic relationships we study compared to those based on mainstream finance theory.
Table 1 provides a summary of these theoretical priors.
Size
Large firms tend to be more diversified and will therefore have a lower risk of bankruptcy costs. Also,
for large firms fixed  direct bankruptcy costs constitute a smaller portion  of firm  value, leading to
relatively lower costs  of  leverage  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988).  For  both,  trade-off  theory  related,
                                                  
14 Note that notwithstanding the positive bivariate relationship between size and leverage in Romania, it is
actually the size category containing the smallest 25% of firms that has the highest median leverage, yet closely
followed by the largest 25% of firms. Klapper et al (2002) find a negative relationship between size and actual
leverage for all countries they study, including Bulgaria and Romania. However, the authors only use 1999 data,
whereas we use data for the 1993-2001 period.
15 See also Harris and Raviv (1991).10
reasons large firms will demand more debt. Pecking order theory stresses that large firms are generally
more transparent to investors, so that problems of information asymmetry will be less severe. Large
firms will then – ceteris paribus – have a higher preference for external financing, either through bank
debt or through issuing bonds or equity. In case of  bank  debt  or  bond  financing,  the  relationship
between size and leverage will be positive. In case of equity financing it will be negative. Given the
underdeveloped CEE stock and corporate bond markets, pecking order considerations in a transition
context would basically mean that large, transparent firms are able to get more bank credit, whereas
small  firms  are  “forced”  to  rely  on  internal  financing.
16  The  relationship  between  size  and  target
leverage will then be positive, reinforcing the prediction of trade-off theory. We measure size as the
log of total assets.
Growth opportunities
According to trade-off theory, agency costs of debt are higher in fast growing firms, as shareholders
have  more  flexibility  to  choose  investments  and  thus  to  expropriate  wealth  from  banks  and
bondholders  (Titman  and  Wessels,  1988).  This  implies  a  negative  relationship  between  growth
opportunities and leverage. On the other hand it can be argued that in case of increased competition in
the banking sector, firms with high growth opportunities will be confronted with a decreasing external
finance  premium  on  bank  credit  (cf.  Jayarante  and  Strahan,  1996).  This  pecking  order  related
mechanism will lead to a positive relationship between growth opportunities and target leverage. We
proxy growth opportunities by the percentage change in total assets from the previous to the current
year.
Tangibility of assets
According to trade-off theory, tangible assets are easier to liquidate in case of bankruptcy, reducing
the costs of financial distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Pecking order theory would stress that,
since  tangible  assets  can  be  used  as  collateral,  they  will  make  the  potential  consequences  of
informational asymmetries less severe for credit suppliers. In both lines of reasoning there will be a
positive relationship between tangibility and target leverage. However, this may not apply to (some)
CEE  countries.  From  a  trade-off  point  of  view,  it  can  be  argued  that  firms  which  mainly  have
(tangible) long-term assets may want to match these with long-term financing only, which is, however,
relatively scarce in most transition countries.
17 Firms with many tangible assets will then use more
long-term debt, but may nevertheless be less leveraged overall: the substitution of long-term debt for
                                                  
16 However, large and transparent firms may raise equity finance on foreign stock markets e.g. through
depository receipts, weakening the positive link between size and leverage even when local stock markets are
relatively small. According to the Corporation of London (2003), somewhat more than 35% of all listings in the
CEE EU acceding countries, representing more than two-thirds of market capitalisation, are cross-listed, mostly
in New York and London.11
short-term  debt  is  less  than  one.  This  will  result  in  no  or  even  a  negative  relationship  between
tangibility and target leverage.
18 Pecking order mechanisms may also weaken or neutralise the positive
effect of tangibility on leverage. This will be the case if asset tangibility does not alleviate the potential
negative consequences of informational asymmetries. This may be due to an ineffective legal system
or to the fact that tangible assets are mostly very specific assets and thus “sunk” (Worthington, 1995).
We measure tangibility as the ratio between tangible fixed assets and total fixed assets.
Profitability
According to trade-off theory, a more profitable (pre-tax) firm will demand more debt to serve as a tax
shield. Moreover, external shareholders may force management to leverage up in order to reduce the
free cash flow from which managers may appropriate perquisites (Jensen, 1986).
19 This results in a
positive relationship between profitability and target leverage. However, this story may not hold, or at
least be incomplete, if there exist large information asymmetries between firms and banks. Banks,
having difficulties with distinguishing good from bad firms, may then  increase their interest rates.
Profitable firms with internal sources of finance will prefer to use these and demand less credit, since
the external finance premium is relatively high. Such pecking order behaviour leads to a negative
relationship between profitability and target leverage.
A positive profitability coefficient thus points to a situation in which external shareholders of
especially profitable firms face an incentive to demand bank debt as a means to shield profits from tax
authorities or grabbing managers. Banks are happy to supply as long as they can easily discriminate
between good and bad firms. A negative profitability coefficient exists if information asymmetries
lead to a large  external financing premium, so that profitable firms  will  prefer  to  use  their  cheap
internal  financing.  Not  so  profitable  firms  will  use  more  bank  debt,  since  they  lack  internal
alternatives. Apparently, banks cannot adequately discriminate between  good and bad firms.  (This
information  asymmetry  is  the  cause  of  the  high  external  finance  premium  in  the  first  place.)  We
measure profitability as pre-tax operating profit (or loss) to total assets.
20
                                                                                                                                                              
17 Booth et al (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) show that firms in developing countries
generally have substantially lower amounts of long-term debt than in industrialised countries.
18 Booth et al (2001) find evidence of such a negative relationship between tangibility and the total debt ratio for
a sample of firms in developing countries and Jelic et al (1999) for Czech and Hungarian companies. As the
former authors find a positive relationship between tangibility and a long-term debt ratio, they take this
combined result as evidence of matching behaviour by firms.
19 To the extent that external ownership of shares is limited, as is the case in most CEE countries, this
mechanism will be less important.
20 One could argue that profitability (“operating profit to total assets”) and growth opportunities (“change in total
assets”) may be highly correlated. However, note that we measure profit pre-tax and pre-dividend. A profitable
firm without any positive net present value projects to invest in, may pay out all profit as dividends without
adding any retained earnings to its balance sheet. Our profitability measure  thus  proxies  for the  “cash  flow
generating” ability of the firm, whereas actual firm growth captures whether the firm can find new profitable
investment and expansion opportunities holding constant the level of profitability. The correlation between total
asset growth and profitability is low and ranges between -2% and 23%.12
Non-tax debt shield
According to trade-off theory higher non-tax debt shields, such as depreciation, make the (tax shield)
advantage of debt financing partly redundant. Hence we expect a negative association between non-
debt tax shields and target leverage (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). We proxy non-debt tax shields as
the ratio between depreciation and total assets.
Income variability
Trade-off theory suggests that higher income variability increases the risk that a firm may not be able
to cover its interest payments, leading to higher expected costs of financial distress. This would result
in a negative relationship between income variability and target leverage. On the other hand, firms
with high income variability may want to create a “spare debt capacity” in order to cushion against
future income shocks. In that case one would expect a positive relationship between income variability
and target leverage. Income variability is measured as the standard deviation of each firm’s turn-over
over the sample period and thus has a single value for all years.
Trade credit
Since we exclude creditors from our leverage measure, we can include it as an explanatory variable.
Trade credit may be an important alternative external financing source for firms that are confronted
with a prohibitive external financing premium in case of the usual sources of external finance. To the
extent that trade credit substitutes for “normal” debt, we expect to find a negative relationship between
the trade credit variable and target leverage. We measure trade credit as the ratio between total credit
by creditors and total assets (the latter decreased by total credit by creditors).
Age
Older firms have a longer track record and thus a higher reputational value. We therefore expect that
older firms will, all else equal, have a higher target leverage ratio since they face a lower external
financing premium on bank debt. Age is measured as the number of years since incorporation.
Firm-specific interest rate
Firms that have to pay relatively high interest rates will, all else equal, demand less loans than the
average firm. This interest rate variable thus intends to proxy for the external finance premium firms
are facing. We calculate the interest rate as [100* total interest paid / (long term debt plus loans)].
21
                                                  
21 In AMADEUS “long term debt” and “loans” are mutually exclusive liability categories.13
Legal form
We control for legal form by using a dummy variable which is one for public firms and zero for all
other firms (private companies, partnerships, sole proprietorships, co-operatives).
22 Public (private)
firms’  capital  is  divided  into  shares  which  can  (cannot)  be  offered  to  the  general  public  and  the
minimum  share  capital  is  higher  for  public  than  for  private  firms.  As  reporting  and  disclosure
requirements are more extensive for public companies, these will generally be more transparent to
outside investors. To the extent that this enables public firms to issue additional shares more easily, we
expect the relationship between the legal dummy and target leverage to be negative.
Macroeconomic and other country specific variables
We capture the effect of time-varying macrofactors as follows. First, we include GDP-growth as a
proxy  for  financing  needs.  According  to  Wanzenried  (2002)  we  should  thus  expect  a  positive
association with target leverage. Yet, new investments may just as well be financed by issuing equity
or out of retained earnings, which will generally increase as well during an economic upswing. The
effect of GDP-growth on firm leverage and adjustment speed is thus ambiguous. It is still included to
see whether on average firms’ leverage differs between high and low growth economic environments.
Second, we include HICP-inflation to control for the influence of a high inflation environment on
book value leverage. This influence may be either negative or positive. In the first case, high inflation
– which often equals more volatile inflation – makes it more costly to contract and thus decreases
firms’ appetite for debt financing. Inflation  will also decrease leverage ratios if  it  mainly leads to
higher nominal profits, higher nominal retained earnings, and thus higher nominal additions to equity.
Yet, these negative effects may be countered by the positive effect of inflation on total debt, which due
to refinancing may inflate faster than equity. Third, in addition to the firm-specific interest rate, we
include  the  3-month  money  market  interest  rate  as  a  proxy  for  the  average  (non-agency)  cost  of
borrowing. Higher interest rates make debt more expensive or even unattainable. We therefore expect
a  negative  relationship  between  the  money  market  interest  rate  and  both  target  leverage  and  the
adjustment speed.  Fourth,  we  include  foreign  bank  penetration  as a  proxy  for  qualitative  banking
development (see appendix for details). We expect that a more developed banking system will make
external  financing  available  for  more  firms,  especially  smaller  ones  (which  may  suffer
disproportionately  from  information  asymmetries).  We  thus  expect  a  positive  coefficient  between
foreign bank penetration and both target leverage and the adjustment speed.
                                                  
22 AMADEUS does not cover state-owned firms.14
Table 1  Firm specific variables and expected relationship with target leverage ratio
Variable Proxy Expected sign Expected sign in
transition economy
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TO: Trade-off theory, PO: Pecking order theory. -/+ indicates a negative/positive expected correlation with the target
leverage ratio. A dot indicates that the particular theory yields no prediction or – in case there is a prediction for industrialised
countries – that there are a priori reasons to expect that the effect for industrialised economies will not materialise in a
transition context. ± indicates that the particular theory yields an inconclusive prediction.
3.3 The determinants of the adjustment speed
As potential determinants of the firm-specific adjustment speed  we consider the  distance from the
target, income variability, and macroeconomic and other country specific variables. The choice for this
particular  subset  of  potential  determinants  is  based  on  the  separate,  static  regressions  explaining
adjustment speed that were performed before estimating the complete dynamic model.
Distance from target
Distance from target is measured as the absolute distance between the target leverage and the actual
leverage at the beginning of the year. We explicitly allow for asymmetries in the adjustment process
by creating two separate distance variables: one for firms with a positive distance (
*
1 ￿ it L > 1 ￿ it L ), which
are thus underleveraged, and one for firms with a negative or no distance (
*
1 ￿ it L d 1 ￿ it L ), which are
thus overleveraged or exactly on target.
23 On the one hand, overleveraged firms may be expected to
reach their targets faster if they can  easily pay-off debt, whereas underleveraged firms have  more
trouble  in  getting  additional  debt.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  the  case  that  it  is  easier  for
underleveraged  firms  to  take  on  additional  debt,  whereas  overleveraged  firms  may  actually  have
difficulties in reducing their debt burden due to liquidity constraints.
                                                  
23 Both variables are expressed in absolute terms. The initial distance variables, which we use as independent
variables in the dynamic model, are the (absolute) residuals generated by the first (static) step of our estimation
strategy (cf. section 2.6).15
For both distance variables a positive association with the adjustment speed will exist if firms that are
further away from their target adjust faster than firms that are close to their target.
24 In that case firms
only adjust – e.g. through some form of financial restructuring – when they have reached a substantial
deviation  from  their  target  capital  structure.  Firms  that  are  close  to  their  target  do  not  close  the
remaining gap because the costs of incremental adjustment are prohibitive. On the contrary, a negative
correlation would indicate that firms that are close to their target adjust quickly to reach this nearby
target.  Yet,  firms  that  are  far  away  from  their  target,  adjust  only  very  incrementally.  A  positive
coefficient thus points to a situation in which gradual adjustment costs are high relative to one-time
financial restructuring costs, whereas a negative  coefficient  points  to  a  situation  in  which  gradual
adjustment  costs  are  relatively  low  when  compared  to  those  of  one-time  financial  restructuring
operations.
Income variability
Income variability – measured as the standard deviation of turn-over – signals uncertainty about a
firm’s  future  incoming  cash  flows.  Especially  for  firms  with  high  income  uncertainty  it  will  be
important to stay close to their leverage target, which may include “spare debt capacity” in order to
cushion against future income shocks. We thus expect a positive relationship.
Macro- economic and other country specific variables
For  GDP-growth, inflation,  the  3-month  interest  rate,  and  foreign  bank  penetration  we  expect  an
ambiguous, ambiguous, negative, and positive relationship, respectively (cf. section 3.2).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Determinants of the target capital structure and the adjustment speed
The regression results for our dynamic model are shown in Table 2. We find that profitability and age
are the most robust determinants of target capital structures across countries. There is a significant
negative relationship between profitability and target leverage in the total sample regression as well as
in six out of ten country regressions. The coefficient ranges between -0.03 and -0.67 and is -0.10 for
the total sample. This last figure implies that an increase in profitability of ten percentage points leads
                                                  
24 Our specification assumes that the adjustment speed is linearly dependent on the absolute distance from the
target. Alternative specifications could introduce threshold effects or convex adjustment costs. We leave this for
further research. Note, however, that in our (non-linear) final specification the distance variable in effect already
enters  the  leverage  equation  in  a  quadratic  form.  This  can  easily  be  seen  by  rewriting  (2a)  as
￿ ￿ 1
*
1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   it it it it it L L L L G . Since  it G is dependent on distance itself, a quadratic distance term enters the
leverage equation.16
to a decrease in the target leverage ratio of about 1 percentage point.
25 Our finding is in line with
Booth  et  al  (2001)  who  find  for  their  set  of  developing  countries  that,  although  capital  structure
determinants  diverge  considerably  between  countries,  “the  most  successful  of  the  independent
variables is profitability, as it is consistently negative and highly significant”. As discussed in section
3.2 the negative coefficients point to information asymmetries which lead to higher external financing
premiums and pecking order behaviour. Still, such a situation may be either largely supply or demand
driven. Negative profitability coefficients as such should thus not be seen as evidence of pure supply
side credit crunching by banks. Cornelli et al (1996) argue that the fact that profitable CEE firms use
retained earnings should be considered as a bad signal, as it shows that firms cannot achieve their
target capital structure due to credit rationing. We disagree with this interpretation since it depends on
the assumption that more profitable firms always demand more debt, for instance to increase their tax
shield. However,  empirical studies show that also in developed countries profitable firms have  on
average  less  debt.  Whereas  CEE  financial  systems  may  thus  still  be  characterised  by  important
information asymmetries, this is not a transition-specific phenomenon. The negative coefficients we
find most likely reflect “normal” pecking order behaviour, rather than a bank credit crunch.
26
We find a second very robust cross-country result for age. In the overall regression as well as
in all individual country regressions age enters positively and significantly. Apparently, older firms are
better able to convince banks to grant them credit. Longer track-records make firms more transparent
and reduce information asymmetries. The coefficient lies for all countries between 0.02 and 0.05 and
is 0.02 in the total sample, so that for each extra year since incorporation a firm’s target leverage will
be approximately 0.02 percentage point higher.
27
Firm growth has a positive and significant coefficient in three countries and is insignificant in
the others and in the overall specification. Apparently, firms with high growth opportunities do not
always  increase  their  target  leverage  (and  through  that  actual  leverage)  in  order  to  exploit  these
opportunities; the role of bank debt in financing firm growth remains limited.
Interestingly, we find a negative relationship between tangibility and debt targets in Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Romania. Apparently, and in line with Nivorozhkin (2003) and the empirical research
cited  in  that  paper,  collateral  does  not  pose  an  effective  guarantee  against  bankruptcy  in  these
countries. On the contrary, firms with many tangible assets have lower debt targets. Possibly these
firms try to match the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities. In that case, particularly firms
with relatively many tangible assets may demand long-term financing, which banks in CEE are still
very reluctant to provide (cf. footnote 18).
                                                  
25 Cornelli et al (1996) find for Hungary and Poland negative coefficients as well.
26 Similarly, Booth et al (2001) interpret the consistent negative relationship between profitability and leverage
in their set of ten developing countries as being consistent with pecking order behaviour.
27 Klapper et al (2002) find a negative relationship between age and leverage, but only use cross-section data for
the year 1999.17
For creditors we find only in the overall regression a significant and positive coefficient. Apparently,
on the individual country level the role of creditors is not important enough to show up significantly.
The positive sign of the coefficient is counterintuitive and implies that trade credit is a supplement
rather than a substitute for “formal” types of credit. We  do not find an effect of the firm-specific
interest rate on the target debt level of firms. Only in Bulgaria do we find a significant, though very
small  negative  effect.  Income  variability  is  only  (positively)  significant  in  Lithuania.  Legal  form
appears  to  be  important  only  in  Latvia  and  Hungary,  where  public  firms  are  significantly  less
leveraged compared to private and “other” firms. Firm size does not influence target leverage ratios in
any of the countries we study. The bivariate relationship between size and actual leverage we find for
some countries (cf. section 3.1) apparently mainly reflects third factors rather than size as such, so that
size does not enter our target leverage regressions as a separate significant variable. Finally, we do not
find evidence of an incentive to increase leverage because of corporate taxes, as our non-debt tax
shield variable enters none of the regressions significantly.
Besides these firm-specific explanatory variables, we also use a set of macro-variables. GDP-
growth  never  enters  significantly,  probably  reflecting  the  fact  that  we  already  take  into  account
investment opportunities at the firm level through firm growth. Inflation has a small negative effect in
the whole sample, but never enters the individual country regressions significantly. The three month
interest rate is only significant in Estonia, though with a counterintuitive positive coefficient.
Interestingly, for Latvia and Romania we find a positive influence on target debt levels of an
increasing  relative  importance  of  foreign  banks.  However,  this  effect  appears  to  be  negative  in
Bulgaria. This last result is consistent with the fact that whereas foreign bank presence may in some
countries decrease problems of asymmetric information, making it possible for firms to increase their
debt levels, this may not have been the main effect in Bulgaria. In this country, soft budget constraint
problems have been protractive and foreign banks entered only later on during the transition process,
so that until now their main influence may have been to harden budget constraints and to cut off loss
making firms from additional credits.
As regards the determinants of the adjustment speed, our most important finding is that in
general the distance from the optimum is positively related to the adjustment speed. Firms that are far
away from their target capital structure tend to adjust more rapidly compared to firms that are close to
their target. Apparently, gradual adjustment costs are high relative to one-time financial restructuring
costs and this holds in most countries for both underleveraged and overleveraged firms. However, in
several countries the distance variable is either only significant for overleveraged firms (Estonia, the
Slovak  Republic,  Hungary),  or  the  coefficient  for  overleveraged  firms  is  higher  than  for
underleveraged firms (Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the complete sample).
The  distance-to-target  effect  on  adjustment  speed  thus  tends  to  be  somewhat  more  important  for
overleveraged firms.Table 2 Regression results dynamic adjustment model
Total
sample





Dependent variable L* L* L* L* L* L* L* L* L* L* L*
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Dependent variable  G G G G G G G G G G G
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**






adj 0.74 0.91 0.96 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.79 0.93 0.62 0.71 0.91
R
2
adj (dynamic, G  fixed) 0.70 0.90 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.76 0.76 0.92 0.20 0.64 0.90
R
2
adj (AR(1)) 0.31 0.62 0.82 0.63 0.71 0.79 0.46 0.59 0.20 0.23 0.62
R
2
adj (static model) 0.09 0.06 0.44 0.07 0.20 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.06
Number of observations 67,125 1,697 2,052 1,715 879 953 11,065 3,806 12,525 24,005 8,428
†: The coefficients for the variables explaining G  are multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes.
Intercept and sector dummies – and in total sample regression: country dummies – not shown.
***,
**,
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.19
This shows that especially for firms with “too  much” bank  credit  it  is  not  worthwhile  to
incrementally decrease their debt burden, as the costs of overleveragedness are apparently
very low. Our results are in line with those of Ju et al (2003) who find that the costs of
moderate deviations from target capital structures – in terms of the negative effect on firm
value – are relatively small when compared to the transaction costs involved, making frequent
incremental leverage adjustments less likely. Finally, for Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and
Hungary we find the expected positive relationship between income volatility and adjustment
speed.  Higher  GDP-growth  increases  the  adjustment  speed  in  Estonia,  Lithuania,  and
Bulgaria, but lowers it in Romania, while  higher inflation  has a positive  influence  on the
adjustment speed in the total sample (and Bulgaria), but again lowers it in Romania.
The last rows in Table 2 give more information as to how the explanatory power of
our dynamic capital structure model is built up. The first row of R
2s shows that our dynamic
model  generally  explains between 62% and 96% of the within-country  variation  in  target
capital structures. The explanatory power in the overall dataset is 74%. Comparing this first
row with the second one, the effect of allowing the adjustment parameter to be both time and
firm specific (rather than fixed per country) becomes clear. For some countries, such as the
Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, and Romania, this adds quite some explanatory power,
whereas  for  others  the  effect  is  only  marginal.  Allowing  for  firm  heterogeneity  in  the
adjustment parameter is for some countries thus more important than for others. The next row
of R
2s shows the explanatory power of a “naïve” model in which a firm’s capital structure is
only explained by the one period lagged capital structure (and a constant). In some cases, such
as Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, this extremely parsimonious model performs quite well.
However,  it  becomes  clear  that  in  most  countries  adding  additional  explanatory  variables
improves  the  explanatory  power  considerably.  Finally,  the  last  row  of  R
2s  shows  the
explained variation by a static model. This is rather low for all countries, except Slovenia. All
in  all,  we  conclude  that  using  a  dynamic  model  rather  than  a  static  one  increases  the
explanatory power significantly. Making the adjustment speed firm and time specific adds
further power to the model, although the importance of this step differs across countries.
As  mentioned  in  footnote  7  we  also  estimated  similar regressions  for  a  model  in
which the adjustment during the current period is made on the basis of 
*
it L  rather than 
*
1 ￿ it L .
28
However, such an approach, as taken by BHW for example, means that in the reduced form
equation that is finally  estimated,  a  potential  for  simultaneity  bias  may  arise.  We  find  in
general very similar estimation results: age and profitability are the most robust determinants
of  target  capital  structures.  Profitability  is  even  significantly  negative  in  nine  out  of  ten
                                                  
28 Including this lag in the regressions as reported in Table 2 led to a data loss of on average 16% per
country.20
countries. Importantly, in these regressions also the growth in total assets appears to be a
particularly important determinant, as we find a positive and significant coefficient in seven
out of ten countries (rather than three in the regressions with a lagged target). Note, however,
that  especially  the  asset  growth  variable  may  be  liable  to  endogeneity  problems  as  net
investments will often be related to financing changes in the same year. We thus conclude
that our model specification has improved our results by preventing any results that may have
been driven by simultaneity bias, especially as regards the growth variable.
In sum, Table 2 shows that profitability and age are the most robust determinants of
CEE firms’ target capital structures and that the signs of the coefficients points to pecking
order behaviour. However, differences between countries as regards additional explanatory
variables are large, confirming the observation by Booth et al (2001) that capital structure
models are only to a limited extent “portable” across countries. Finally, we find that firms that
are further away from their target adjust faster than firms that are very near their target, both
in the case of underleveraged and overleveraged firms.
4.2 The ratio between the target capital structure and the actual capital structure
Using the estimated coefficients as summarised in Table 2, we calculate the target capital
structures  as  well  as  the  speed  of  adjustment  towards  these  targets.  Figure  3  shows  the
development of the ratio between the target leverage and observed leverage. At the individual
firm level the actual leverage equals the firms’ target if the ratio is one. If the ratio is larger
(smaller)  than  one,  this  indicates  that  firms  are  underleveraged  (overleveraged).  For  our
complete database we find that of a total of 69,841 observations – 48,358 observations (69%)
concern  underleveraged  firms,  whereas  21,483  observations  (31%)  concern  overleveraged
firms. This is a first indication that most CEE firms have less debt then they would like to
have. To gain more insight, we again divide all observations in four quartiles and calculate the
median ratio for each of these. For instance, if the ratio for large firms is higher than one this
implies that the median large firm is underleveraged, i.e. more than 50% of all large firms are
underleveraged. We find that in all countries and in almost all size categories the median firm
is still underleveraged.
29 In 2000 and 2001 underleveragedness was most severe in Bulgaria,
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic, whereas firms were closest to their leverage targets in
Latvia, Hungary, and Estonia (Table 3).
                                                  
29 Exceptions are (very) large Latvian firms and the smallest Hungarian firms which have become
somewhat overleveraged.21
Table 3 Average ratio target leverage (L*) to
actual leverage (L) 2000-2001
Country (L* / L) Country (L* / L)
1. Latvia 0.96 6. Lithuania 1.51
2. Hungary 1.01 7. Czech Republic 1.53
3. Estonia 1.05 8. Slovak Republic 1.70
4. Poland 1.25 9. Slovenia 1.75
5. Romania 1.49 10. Bulgaria 2.20
A higher ratio equals more severe underleveragedness. Ratio is calculated as the
mean of the median ratio for each size quartile in both 2000 and 2001.
However, we also find that over time firms in all size categories in Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania have gradually been able to  bring  their  actual  leverage
closer to their targets. This trend is also observable in the Slovak Republic, except for small
firms which have become severely underleveraged after 1998. Also in the Czech Republic
particularly small and very small firms have become more underleveraged since 1998, while
this trend had been less pronounced for large and very large firms.
30 In Poland very small and
small firms have gradually become somewhat (more) underleveraged, whereas large and very
large  firms  have  on  the  contrary  become  less  underleveraged.  Bulgarian  firms  became
gradually  less  underleveraged  since  the  beginning  of  the  transition  period  and  got  even
somewhat overleveraged in 1997. Although actual leverage has gradually increased after the
crisis period, Bulgarian firms appear to have become chronically underleveraged, even the
largest  firms.  Finally,  we  use  the  ownership  information  in  AMADEUS  to  differentiate
between domestic and foreign firms.
31 Although we find in general no important differences
between  domestic  and  foreign  firms  as  regards  actual  and  target  leverage  or  adjustment
speeds, we do find that especially in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic foreign
firms have become more leveraged and closer to their targets than domestic firms. Domestic
firms have – on the contrary – become (more) underleveraged.
                                                  
30 This is in line with Lízal and Svejnar (2002) who show on the basis of firm level data from the Czech
Statistical Office that in the Czech Republic co-operatives and small private firms have been credit
rationed.
31 We define a foreign firm as a firm which had a majority of foreign owners in 2001. All other firms
were considered to be domestically owned.22
Figure 3   Ratio target leverage to actual leverage (L* / L) very small, small,


















































































































Apparently, foreign firms have been better able to circumvent the credit crunch by domestic
banks, either because of better characteristics or because of closer relationships with (foreign)
banks.
32 In a similar vein, Latvian and Hungarian domestic firms have  gradually (almost)
reached their target leverage, whereas foreign firms are overshooting their targets and have
become consistently overleveraged (see Table A2 in the appendix for exact figures).
In sum, we find that CEE firms have generally been able to bring actual leverage
ratios  more  in  line  with  their  internal  targets.  However,  a  majority  of  firms  is  still
underleveraged and in some countries especially small and very small firms have become
more underleveraged after the financial crises during the second half of the 1990’s. In several
countries foreign firms have been able to get closer to their targets, or to even overshoot them,
whereas domestic firms stayed underleveraged or became even more underleveraged.
4.3 The speed of adjustment
Figure 4 depicts the development of the adjustment speed. Differences between size groups
are  in  most  countries  marginal.  Yet,  when  we  correlate  firms’  size  with  their  adjustment
speeds,  we  find  a  positive  and  significant  (5%  level)  correlation  in  Latvia,  Hungary,  the
Slovak Republic, and Poland. Similarly, when we correlate firms’ yearly adjustment speeds
with a time dummy, we find a tendency (5% level) for firms to decrease their adjustment
speeds over time in Estonia, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
Table 4 Average adjustment speed 2000-2001 in percentages
Country G Country G
1. Bulgaria 19 6. Latvia 13
2. Estonia 17 7. Lithuania 12
3. Czech Republic 16 8. Poland 11
4. Romania 14 9. Slovak Republic 9
5. Hungary 13 10. Slovenia 2
Table  4  shows  that  in  2000  and  2001  the  average  adjustment  speed  was  between  2%
(Slovenia) and 19% (Bulgaria).
33 On average, firms adjust about 13% of the gap between their
actual and desired leverage ratio, which means it will take a bit less than four years to close
half of the leverage gap.
                                                  
32 Similarly, Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997) find that in Poland during the early transition years
(1991-1994) foreign firms were much more leveraged than domestic firms.
33 Nivorozhkin (2003) finds for the Czech Republic an average adjustment speed of 15% for the 1994-
1997 period (we: 16% for 1995-1997) and for Bulgaria 43% (we: 27% same period).
Calculated as the the mean of the median  G  for each size quartile in
both 2000 and 2001.24













































































These adjustment speeds are significantly lower than those for the US (27%) and the UK
(28%), and more in line with for instance Sweden and the Netherlands (10% in both
countries).
34 The lower adjustment speeds in CEE (and Western Europe) when compared to
the UK and the US may point to pecking order behaviour, as firms adjust their capital
structure slowly, e.g. only in case additional investment financing is necessary.
35
5 Summary and conclusions
We use a dynamic capital structure model to study the adjustment process of firms towards
their target capital structures. We endogenise both the target leverage ratio and the adjustment
speed and apply the model to microdata for 10 CEE countries (1993-2001). Compared to a
static  capital  structure  model,  our  dynamic  model  increases  the  explanatory  power
significantly. Generalising the adjustment speed by  making it firm and time specific adds
further power, but the importance of this differs across countries.
Our data show that actual CEE leverage ratio’s are mostly still (considerably) below
Western standards, although there is a clear upward trend in firms’ leverage  in almost all
countries. The gradual development of the financial system has enabled firms to reach higher
debt levels. Based on our estimations we show that in most countries there is also a tendency
for firms to  gradually  bring  their  actual  leverage  closer  to  their  internal  targets,  although
adjustment speeds are relatively low. Yet, across the board firms are still underleveraged and
in some countries especially small and very small firms have become more underleveraged
after the financial crises during the second half of the 1990’s. We also find that in several
countries foreign firms have been able to get closer to their targets, or even overshoot them,
whereas domestic firms stayed underleveraged.
As  regards  the  determinants  of  firms’  leverage  we  find  that  differences  between
countries as regards explanatory variables are large, implying that capital structure models are
only to a limited extent “portable” across countries. Nevertheless, we find that profitability
and age are very robust determinants of target capital structures. These results contribute to
our understanding of the role that credit markets are currently playing in CEE. In particular
we find that (1) firms’ leverage targets are negatively influenced by their profitability and
                                                  
34 Sweden: Lööf (2003), sample period averages. For The Netherlands we estimated a dynamic
adjustment model and found an average adjustment speed of 10%. Wanzenried (2002) also finds that
UK firms have a significantly higher adjustment speed.
35 A potential complication when comparing adjustment speeds across countries is that different
countries may experience different macroeconomic shocks, so that in some countries firms are on
average further away from their targets than in other, more stable countries. Adjustment speed
differences would then not only reflect e.g. differences in the financial system, but also differences as
regards the challenges firms are confronted with when trying to reach internal targets. We aim to
control for such different macroeconomic environments by including a number of macroeconomic
determinants in the adjustment speed specification (besides firm level explanatory variables such as the
firm specific distance from the target).26
positively by their age, (2) that adjustment speeds are relatively low, and that (3) firms that
are further away from their leverage target adjust faster than firms that are already close to
their target. All three findings point to the importance of information asymmetries between
firms and banks, by far the main suppliers of external finance in CEE. As a result, external
finance premiums are relatively high, making it rational for especially profitable firms to rely
on internal financing. At the same time, such pecking order behaviour means that  capital
structure adjustments are only slowly implemented. Also, firms that are not too far away from
their leverage target do not find it worthwhile to get back on track immediately, probably
because the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. Only when under- or overleveragedness
becomes a significant problem firms resort to some kind of financial restructuring to get back
to their target leverage.
Although the development of the CEE banking systems has enabled firms to reach
higher debt levels, bringing them closer to their own targets, the costs associated with external
funding are still relatively high. From a policy perspective this means that there seems to be
ample room in CEE  to  further  deepen,  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively,  the  financial
systems. This will not only increase the value of firms, but will also stimulate real economic
development in these countries. Future research may apply dynamic capital structure models
to a wider range of Western (European) countries as well, so that more definite conclusions
can be drawn about the relative  merits of  different financial systems in allowing firms to
optimise their value by staying close to their internal leverage targets.
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Stylised balance sheet of an individual firm in AMADEUS
(Variable names in capitals)
Fixed assets                                                    FIAS
- Intangible                                                 IFAS
- Tangible                                                  TFAS
- Other                                                       OFAS
Current assets                                               CUAS
- Stock                                                      STOK
- Debtors                                                   DEBT
- Other                                                      OCAS
- Cash & cash equivalent                         CASH
Shareholder funds                                         SHFD
- Capital                                                   CAPI
- Other                                                      OSFD
Non-current liabilities                                  NCLI
- Long-term debt                                      LTDB
- Other                                                     ONCL
Current liabilities                                         CULI
- Loans                                                    LOAN
- Creditors                                                CRED
- Other                                                     OCLI
Total Assets                                                  TOAS Total Liabilities                                             TOAS
Information  on  GDP-growth  and  interest  rates  was  taken  from  the  IMF’s  International
Financial  Statistics  (IFS).  The  variable  “foreign  bank  penetration”  was  constructed  by
subtracting column J (cross-border claims with head offices outside the country) from the sum
of column A (cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies)30
and L (local currency claims on local residents) as taken from the BIS Consolidated Banking
Statistics Databank Block M and dividing the result by line 32 (“domestic credit”) from the
IFS (in US dollars).
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Data construction
All data are expressed as millions of euro. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as
100*
non-current and current liabilities - creditors
non-current and current liabilities - creditors + shareholder funds
One  may expect LEV to be between 0 and 100 as both total  debt  (in  the  nominator  and
denominator NCLI+CULI-CRED) and shareholder funds (SHFD in the denominator) should
be zero or positive. Under exceptional circumstances, however, LEV may be lower than 0 or
higher than 100. The first holds if SHFD is negative and its absolute value even exceeds total
debt. Total assets is then negative. This case will be highly unlikely. The latter holds in case
SHFD  is  negative  but  does  in  absolute  value  not  exceed  debt.  In  that  case,  the  firm  is
theoretically bankrupt, but may be kept alive by creditors, either because discounted expected
future profits exceed the current equity gap, or because creditors (such as state-owned banks)
have goals other than profit maximisation. In both cases creditors may decide to keep funding
bankrupt firms (in the latter case the firm has a soft budget constraint). As the descriptive
statistics in Table A1 make clear, negative values for LEV were in most countries (almost)
completely absent, whereas values larger than 100 were present in all countries but not of
significant importance. Also note that since the dynamic model is estimated unrestrictedly, a
number of calculated optimal leverage values might actually be negative or larger than 100
whereas the actual leverage value lies between zero and 100. In practice, the model performed
very  well  in  this  regards:  the  percentage  observations  (not  noted  in  Table  A1)  where
> @ 0 , 1 , 0
* m ￿ ￿ ￿ L L  was zero in all countries, except for Latvia, Bulgaria, and Hungary
where it was 0.1%. Similarly, the percentage observations where  > @ o ￿ ￿ ￿ , 1 1 , 0
* L L  was
zero in all countries except for Poland and Lithuania (0.1%) and Slovenia (0.8%).
The variable VARTURN is constructed as the standard deviation of turnover over time, so it
is firm specific. For some countries operating revenue is taken instead of turnover for reasons
of data availability. The variable PROFITS is defined as profit or loss as a percentage of total
assets. Depending on availability per country, profit or loss was calculated before or after
taxation.
Data selection
We  dropped  observations  if:  (1)  non-current  and  current  liabilities  did  not  exceed  the
creditors, i.e. the nominator of LEV was negative; (2) capital (CAPI) was negative, or (3) the
annual growth of total assets exceeded 1000%. A firm was only dropped in the year where
one or more of the above mentioned characteristics held. For Slovenia we excluded CRED
since data for this variable were missing for several years. After these selections, the number
of consecutive years of observation was counted for each firm. We only included those firms
in our sample for which we have at least three consecutive observations. At the beginning of
the transition process some firms may have reported their balance sheet and profit and loss
account figures with a lot of noise. For this reason we dropped the years 1993, 1994 and 1995
during the estimation phase. In spite of the loss of information, we think that this improves
the reliability of our estimates. We use the parameters that were estimated on the basis of this
                                                  
36 For more details on the construction of the foreign bank penetration measure see De Haas and
Lelyveld (2004)31
reduced sample to calculate – in combination with the 1993-1995 data that were left out when
estimating – the target leverage and speed of adjustment for 1993-1995 as well.
Table A1 Summary statistics (in order of increasing population size)







1.4 2.0 2.4 3.6 5.4 7.7 10.1 10.2 22.5 38.6
Median TOAS
(mln …￿
2.0 13.2 2.3 4.4 4.7 0.8 4.9 4.8 1.3 5.6
Median
SHFD/TOAS
45.7 54.4 41.4 54.5 47.8 56.5 45.5 44.2 44.2 41.6
Median
NCLI/TOAS
5.7 3.5 5.7 3.3 6.6 0.1 1.4 8.5 0.4 3.1
Median
CULI/TOAS
38.5 33.4 37.6 32.0 35.7 33.8 46.2 37.1 44.3 46.4
% observations
with LEV<0
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.6 0 0.6 0.2 0.1
% observations
with LEV>100




1,697 2,052 1,715 879 953 11,065 3,806 12,525 24,005 8,428
Total no. of
observations
2,099 2,052 1,763 881 985 12,437 3,870 13,257 24,007 8,490
Table A2 Development of L* / L of domestic and foreign firms in selected
countries (median ratio)

















1995 2.28 n/a 1.68 1.57 1.18 1.37 1.65 n/a
1996 1.73 n/a 1.50 1.36 1.16 0.95 1.39 2.20
1997 1.43 2.49 1.34 1.19 1.16 0.95 1.30 1.20
1998 1.44 3.00 1.47 1.15 1.13 0.92 1.15 1.03
1999 1.37 1.13 1.64 1.15 1.03 0.92 1.11 0.92
2000 1.59 0.96 1.84 1.19 1.03 0.85 1.10 0.98
2001 1.54 0.92 1.90 1.38 1.01 0.89 1.12 0.94